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UNITED STATES V. INADI: CO-CONSPIRATORS LOSE
THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND
HEARSAY
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century, the United States Supreme Court has strug-
gled to reconcile the competing interests of a criminal defendant's right
to confrontation as mandated in the sixth amendment with the
prosecutorial need for admitting relevant information through the use of
hearsay exceptions.' The sixth amendment's confrontation clause pro-
vides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him... ."2 How-
ever, some hearsay exceptions3 allow out-of-court statements to be ad-
mitted at trial for their truth even when the maker of the statement is
absent from the courtroom.' These hearsay exceptions appear to conflict
with a criminal defendant's confrontation right. The Supreme Court has
held that the right of confrontation and the law of hearsay are not coex-
tensive.5 Thus, admitting a hearsay statement into evidence may violate
the confrontation clause although the evidence falls within a recognized
hearsay exception.6 Conversely, evidence admitted in violation of the
1. Thirty-one states, the military and Puerto Rico have adopted evidence codes which are
identical or substantially similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, Note on State Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evidence; Military Rules of Evidence in
1 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE T-1 (1986).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, cl. 2.
3. FED. R. EVID. 801(d), 803. Rule 803 enumerates hearsay exceptions whereas Rule
801(d) enumerates hearsay exemptions. The Supreme Court makes no distinction between
hearsay exceptions and exemptions in its analysis of the confrontation clause. United States v.
Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1128 n.12 (1986). In this Note, they will both be referred to as
exceptions.
4. See infra note 295 for a discussion of hearsay exceptions which require a showing of
unavailability and those in which availability is immaterial.
5. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). The Court stated that "[i]t seems apparent
that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from
the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two .... ." Id. at 86. In a footnote, the
Court noted that the constitutional provision may be based on a common-law principle having
its origin in a reaction to the abuses at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Id. at 86 n. 16. See infra
note 53.
6. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (preliminary hearing testimony used against
defendant); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (preliminary hearing testimony used against
defendant). See infra notes 92-109 and 64-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
respective cases.
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hearsay rules does not necessarily mean that the accused's confrontation
right has been violated.7 The Supreme Court has stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is
complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or
less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their excep-
tions .... Our decisions have never established such a congru-
ence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of
confrontation values even though the statements in issue were
admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception. The
converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in
violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been
denied.'
The difficulty in balancing the competing interests of this constitu-
tional protection with the necessity of admitting relevant information can
be evidenced in trying to reconcile the Court's interpretations. 9 Justice
Harlan once wrote that "the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded
parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended
scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause."'" In 1980, how-
ever, the Court in Ohio v. Roberts"I appeared to put to rest the uncer-
tainty about the relationship between the confrontation clause and the
law of hearsay when it announced that "a general approach to the prob-
lem is discernible."' 2 The Court established a two-prong test for deter-
mining when an out-of-court statement falling within a hearsay exception
may be admitted without violating the accused's confrontation right.
The Court stated that "the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of neces-
sity .... [T]he prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the un-
availability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the
7. See Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 236-37 (1968);
Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1966).
8. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 81-82 (citations and footnotes omitted) (citing California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970)).
9. See infra notes 53-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict between
the confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions. See also Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation
Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 217-21 (1984); Kirkpatrick, Confronta-
tion and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN.
L. REv. 665, 670-77 (1986).
10. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
11. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 162-87 for a discussion of the
case.
12. 448 U.S. at 65.
January 1988] CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY 545
defendant .... Even then, [the] statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability.' "s Thus, the Court established the clear
constitutional requirement of unavailability 14 and reliability for the lower
courts to follow. 5
The Court's recent decision, United States v. Inadi,'6 retreats from
the two-prong test announced in Roberts'7 by limiting the unavailability
requirement to only prior testimony. This Note examines the potential
effect of the Inadi 8 decision and finds that the Court failed to answer the
question of when unavailability must be shown. Therefore, after the In-
adi decision the courts are thrown back into a state of confusion over the
relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, a jury convicted the defendant, Joseph Inadi, of conspiring to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and four related narcotics
13. Id. at 65-66.
14. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) defines unavailability of a witness as follows:
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in
which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testify-
ing concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 950 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985) (unavailability
of co-conspirator declarant must be shown to admit declarant's out-of-court statements against
defendant); United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1115 (1985) (unavailability of co-conspirator declarant must be shown to admit declarant's
out-of-court statements against defendant); United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802 (9th
Cir. 1984) (unavailability of out-of-court declarant must be shown to admit declarant's ledger
entries against defendant); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984) (incompetence of minor satisfied unavailability requirement to
admit extrajudicial statements against defendant); United States v. Lisotto, 722 F.2d 85. 88
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984) (fugitive co-conspirators satisfied unavailabil-
ity requirement to admit extrajudicial statements against defendant). Cf. United States v.
Panas, 738 F.2d 278, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1984) (unavailability need not be shown to admit evi-
dence under co-conspirator exemption): United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982) (admission of statements by alleged co-conspirator
does not violate confrontation clause).
16. 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1125-26 (1986).
17. 448 U.S. at 65-66.
18. 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1123 (1986).
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charges. 19 He was sentenced to three years imprisonment followed by
seven years parole.2°
Michael McKeon (McKeon), an unindicted co-conspirator, testified
at trial under a grant of use immunity2' that he approached Inadi in
September of 1979 seeking a distribution outlet for methamphetamine. 2
They reached an agreement whereby Inadi was to supply cash and chem-
icals for the manufacture of the drug and was to be responsible for its
distribution.23 McKeon and William Levan (Levan), another unindicted
co-conspirator, were responsible for manufacturing the substance.24
During the conspiracy, Inadi, McKeon and Levan met with John
Lazaro (Lazaro), the third unindicted co-conspirator, at a house to ex-
tract additional methamphetamine from the liquid residue of previous
batches of the substance.25 On May 23, 1980, two police officers surrepti-
tiously entered the house with a warrant and confiscated a tray of drying
methamphetamine. 26 The police delayed returning the tray, leaving the
conspirators speculating over what happened to it.
27
On May 25, 1980, two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents
observed a meeting between Inadi and Lazaro in the parking lot of a
restaurant. 28 During the course of the meeting, the agents saw Inadi lean
on Lazaro's car.29 After Lazaro drove away, the agents stopped his
car. 30 They searched Lazaro, his wife, Marianne, who was a passenger,
and the vehicle, but found nothing.3 Eight hours later, another DEA
agent returned to the scene of the stop and found a clear plastic bag
containing a white powder which was later identified as
methamphetamine.3 2 Marianne Lazaro testified at trial-under a grant
of use immunity-that after the meeting in the parking lot, her husband
handed her a clear plastic bag containing white powder.33 During the
19. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1123 (1986).
20. Id.
21. "Use immunity" protects a witness from subsequent use of the immunized testimony
against the witness in a criminal prosecution. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 355 (E. Cleary, 3d ed.
1984).
22. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1123.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1984).
29. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1123.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1123-24.
33. Inadi, 748 F.2d at 815, rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
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search of the car, she threw the bag away.34 At trial, she denied that the
bag and powder found by the agent were the items that her husband had
given her.35
From May 23 to May 27, 1980, the police recorded five telephone
conversations between the participants in the conspiracy. 36 The conver-
sations, played for the jury at trial, consisted of three discussions between
Inadi and Lazaro in which: (1) Lazaro appeared to ask in code for some
methamphetamine; (2) they speculated about the missing tray taken from
the house; (3) they set up a meeting at the restaurant parking lot; and
(4) they discussed the DEA car stop.
3 7
Inadi sought to exclude the recorded statements of Lazaro and the
others on the basis that the statements did not satisfy the requirements of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 38 which governs the out-of-court
statements of co-conspirators. 39 The trial court ruled that the conversa-
tions were admissible, finding that they were made in the course of, and
in furtherance of, the conspiracy." Inadi also objected to admission of
the statements on the ground that his confrontation rights had been vio-
lated since the prosecution did not show Lazaro to be unavailable. 4, The
trial judge suggested that the prosecution bring Lazaro to court in order
to demonstrate his unavailability.42 The co-conspirator statements were
admitted on the condition that the prosecution produce Lazaro.4 3
Lazaro was subpoenaed by the government but failed to appear, claiming
car trouble.' When Inadi renewed his confrontation right objection by
arguing that the prosecution had not demonstrated Lazaro's unavailabil-
ity, the court overruled the objection.45 The court ruled that Lazaro's
statements were admissible because they satisfied the explicit require-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1124.
37. Inadi, 748 F.2d at 815.
38. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides "[a] statement is not hearsay if...
[t]he statement is offered against a party and is... a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
39. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1124.
40. Id.
41. Id. Marianne Lazaro and Michael McKeon were unindicted co-conspirators who tes-
tified under grants of use immunity. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 814-15 (3d Cir.
1984). William Levan was unavailable because he asserted his fifth amendment privilege. In-
adi, 748 F.2d at 819 n.6.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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ments of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).4 6
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
Inadi's right of confrontation had been violated.47 The court, relying on
Ohio v. Roberts,48 held that although Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) had been satisfied, the right of confrontation established an
independent requirement that unavailability of the declarant must be
shown before the extrajudicial statement could be admitted.49
The Supreme Court granted certiorari50 to resolve the issue of
whether the confrontation clause requires a showing of unavailability as
a condition of admitting out-of-court declarations of co-conspirators
although the statements satisfy the federal rule of evidence.5 t The Court
held that the confrontation clause does not require a showing of the co-
conspirator's unavailability.2
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Cases Prior to Ohio v. Roberts
In the late 1800's, the Supreme Court recognized that the primary
objective of the confrontation clause was to prevent ex parte depositions
and affidavits from being used against the accused in lieu of face-to-face
confrontation before the jury.53 In the leading case of Mattox v. United
States,54 the Court held:
46. Id; see supra note 38.
47. Id.
48. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
49. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1124 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
50. 105 S. Ct. 2653 (1985).
51. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1124.
52. Id. at 1129.
53. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the vice which gave rise to the confronta-
tion clause stemmed from the practice in England of trying defendants on "evidence" consist-
ing solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions which denied the defendant the opportunity to
challenge the accuser face-to-face before the trier of fact. Prosecutorial authorities would al-
lege matters and offer proof by reading to the court such items as depositions, confessions of
accomplices and letters. The accused would deny such matters and demand face-to-face con-
frontation with the witnesses. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603 is a famous example of this abuse.
Crucial to the prosecution was the statement of a witness implicating Raleigh in a plot to seize
the throne. Later, Raleigh received a written retraction from the witness and expected the
witness to testify in his favor. A lengthy dispute ensued as to whether Raleigh could call the
witness to testify on his behalf. The witness was not called and Raleigh was convicted and
executed. The confrontation clause has been traced by some to the common-law reaction
against such abuses. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951). A description of
the trial is offered in Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100-01 (1972).
54. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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The primary object of the [confrontation clause] . . . [is] not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.5
In Mattox, the Court dealt with whether a court reporter's notes of
crucial prior testimony, given by two prosecution witnesses at the de-
fendant's earlier murder trial, could be accepted into evidence.5 6 The
witnesses died prior to the accused's retrial.57 Holding that the defend-
ant's constitutional rights had not been violated by admitting a copy of
the stenographer's full report under oath because both witnesses had
been fully examined and cross-examined at the prior trial in the presence
of the accused, 8 the Court stated:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being
used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness
The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved
to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the
witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a
cross-examination.59
The Court weighed its preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial against practical considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case.6" It analogized the reliability of the deceased witnesses' state-
ments to a dying declaration which had been an exception to the hearsay
rules "from time immemorial."61 Because impending death presumably
removes all temptations of falsehood and gives the statements the same
weight as if made under oath, the Court reasoned that "there is equal if
not greater reason for admitting testimony of [the witnesses'] statements
which were made under oath."62
Until recently, few decisions invoked the confrontation clause. This
55. Id. at 242-43.
56. Id. at 240.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 244.
59. Id. at 242-44.
60. Id. at 243.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 244.
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lack of case law may be explained by the former inapplicability of the
confrontation clause to the states.63 However, in 1965, the Supreme
Court held in Pointer v. Texas" that the confrontation clause was appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.65
In Pointer, the petitioner was arrested for robbery and brought
before a state judge for a preliminary hearing. 66 Pointer was not repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing nor did he cross-examine the com-
plaining witness.67 At trial, the transcript of the testimony of the state's
chief witness at the preliminary hearing was admitted into evidence be-
cause the witness had moved to another state and did not intend to re-
turn. 68 Pointer objected, arguing that he was denied his right of
confrontation. 69 The Court held that Pointer's confrontation rights had
been violated by the use of the transcript. 70 The Court stated that it
earlier had held in Gideon v. Wainright71 that the sixth amendment's
right to counsel was a fundamental right, and thus applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment.72 Similarly, the sixth amendment's
right of confrontation, including the right of cross-examination, was also
held to be a fundamental right which the fourteenth amendment obli-
gates the states to follow. 73 Stating that no one could seriously doubt
that the right of the accused to confront witnesses against him included
the right of cross-examination,74 the Court quoted its holding in Turner
v. Louisiana :75
"In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case
necessarily implies at the very least that the 'evidence devel-
oped' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in
a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the
defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of
counsel." 76
However, the Court did not rule out admitting into evidence testi-
63. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1398 at 197 (3d ed. 1974).
64. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
65. Id. at 403.
66. Id. at 401.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 408.
71. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
72. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
73. Id. at 403.
74. Id. at 404.
75. 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).
76. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405.
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mony from all preliminary hearings stating that "[t]he case before us
would be quite a different one had [the witness'] statement been taken at
a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by coun-
sel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-
examine."77 Thus, Pointer made the fundamental protection of the con-
frontation clause applicable to the states. The Pointer Court emphasized
face-to-face confrontation, cross-examination and representation by
counsel, without distinguishing the differences between preliminary hear-
ings and trials.
In Douglas v. Alabama,78 decided the same day as Pointer,7" the pe-
titioner claimed his confrontation rights were violated at the trial rather
than at the preliminary hearing. ° Douglas and an accomplice were tried
separately in state court for assault with intent to murder.81 The accom-
plice was called as a state witness in Douglas' trial but repeatedly refused
to testify on the ground of self-incrimination.82 The judge declared the
accomplice a hostile witness and gave the prosecutor the privilege of
cross-examination.
83
Under the guise of cross-examination to refresh the witness' mem-
ory, the prosecutor read aloud the accomplice's purported confession in-
culpating Douglas.84 The prosecutor repeatedly asked the witness if he
had made the statements, but the accomplice asserted his privilege and
refused to answer.85 The Court relied on Mattox86 to support its holding
that the object of the confrontation clause was to prevent depositions, or
ex parte affidavits, from being used against the accused in lieu of personal
examination and cross-examination of a witness.87 The witness' alleged
confession was the only direct evidence that Douglas had fired the
weapon. 88 Coupled with the description of the surrounding events, the
confession formed a crucial link in proving Douglas had committed the
crime.8" The Court held that Douglas' inability to cross-examine the ac-
77. Id. at 407.
78. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
79. Id. at 418.
80. Id. at 416-17.
81. Id. at 416.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
87. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418-19 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895)).
88. Id. at 419.
89. Id.
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complice about the confession, along with the prosecutor's reading of
it-which may have been treated by the jury as evidence that the confes-
sion was true-denied Douglas his right of cross-examination secured by
the confrontation clause." The Court reaffirmed that "[o]ur cases con-
struing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by
it is the right of cross-examination ...."9'
Three years later, in Barber v. Page,92 the Court further defined the
requirements of the confrontation clause by adding unavailability as an
important element and by distinguishing the right as basically a trial
right.93 Barber and a co-defendant were jointly charged with armed rob-
bery.94 At a preliminary hearing, the co-defendant's testimony incrimi-
nated Barber.95 Although Barber was represented by counsel at the
hearing, counsel did not cross-examine the co-defendant.9 6 At trial, the
state offered the preliminary hearing testimony as its principal evidence
against Barber.97 The testimony was offered based on the witness'
unavailablity since he was incarcerated in a federal prison in another
state and was outside the court's jurisdiction.
98
Recognizing that the Court traditionally had made an exception to
the confrontation requirement when a witness was unavailable but had
given testimony subject to cross-examination at a previous judicial pro-
ceeding, the Barber Court stated that this exception arose from neces-
sity.99 For example, in Mattox, the witnesses who testified at the
accused's earlier trial died prior to the re-trial. 1°° The exception had
90. Id. at 418-20.
91. Id. at 418.
92. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
93. Id. at 724-25.
94. Id. at 720.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 720. Both the petitioner and the co-defendant were initially represented by the
same counsel at the preliminary hearing. Id. During the course of the hearing, the co-defend-
ant waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. Counsel then withdrew as the co-de-
fendant's attorney but continued to represent Barber. Id. The state argued that Barber was
afforded the right of cross-examination but that he did not utilize it. Id. at 722. Although the
Court assumed that Barber made a valid waiver of his right to cross-examination, it stated that
such an assumption was open to considerable question. Id. In a footnote, the Court noted the
dilemma of the attorney. Id. at 722 n.1. Presumably counsel and the co-defendant discussed
the co-defendant's involvement in the crime and cross-examination would have revealed confi-
dential communications. Id. Even if under state law the co-defendant waived the attorney-
client privilege by testifying, the Court recognized that counsel was still confronted with seri-
ous ethical considerations under the circumstances. Id.
97. Id. at 720.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 722.
100. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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been justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initially
afforded satisfied the purposes underlying the confrontation clause. 101
But the Barber Court noted that the state had made absolutely no effort
to secure the presence of the witness, other than to ascertain he was in-
carcerated in another state. 102 Barber held that for the purposes of the
exception to the confrontation requirement, a witness is not "unavaila-
ble" unless the prosecution has made a "good faith effort" to obtain the
witness' presence at trial.10 3 The Court stated that it would reach the
same result even if counsel had cross-examined the witness at the prelim-
inary hearing. °4 Barber noted that a preliminary hearing is a much less
searching exploration into the merits of the case than a trial because a
hearing's purpose is to determine whether probable cause exists to hold
the accused for trial. 105 Distinguishing a preliminary hearing from a
trial, the Court stated:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the
jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness.... While there may
be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-
examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the
demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is
shown to be actually unavailable, this is not.., such a case. 106
The Barber Court appeared to retract its earlier suggestion in
Pointer 107 that a defendant's confrontation rights would not be violated if
the witness had been subject to cross-examination at a preliminary hear-
ing.108 The Court in Barber held that even if a witness has been fully
cross-examined at a preliminary hearing, the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony violates the defendant's confrontation right unless the
prosecutorial authorities show through "good faith efforts" that they
101. Barber, 390 U.S. at 722.
102. Id. at 723. The Court acknowledged that previously courts and commentators had
assumed that if a witness was outside a court's jurisdiction, it was sufficient grounds for dis-
pensing with confrontation requirements because the court could not compel attendance.
However, the Court stated that increased cooperation between the states and between the
states and the federal government rendered this assumption invalid. The Court noted that if a
witness was in federal custody, the federal courts had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus
ad testificandum at the request of state prosecutors. In addition, it was the policy of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to allow federal prisoners to testify in state criminal proceed-
ings with these same writs issued by state courts. Id. at 723-24.
103. Id. at 724-25.
104. Id. at 725.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
107. 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); see supra text accompanying note 77.
108. 390 U.S. at 725.
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tried to secure the presence of the witness.'0 9 Thus, Barber added to the
confrontation clause the constitutional requirement of unavailability of a
witness to the established requirement of cross-examination.
Two years later, in 1970, the Court again interpreted the require-
ments of the confrontation clause. In California v. Green,I"o the Court
found no constitutional objection to a state rule of evidence which per-
mitted the use of prior inconsistent statements to be admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted if the defendant was given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness at trial."'I In Green, the chief prosecution wit-
ness testified against the defendant at a preliminary hearing in which the
witness was extensively cross-examined. 1 2  However, the witness
claimed a lapse of memory two months later at trial, stating that he was
on drugs at the time of the crime. 13 The prosecution read exerpts from
the witness' prior testimony." 4 Under the California Evidence Code, the
evidence was admissible as substantive evidence. 1 5 The Court held that
the accused's confrontation rights had not been violated by admitting the
witness' preliminary hearing testimony as long as the witness testified at
trial and was subject to cross-examination." 6
In its decision, the Court acknowledged that the purpose behind the
confrontation clause was to insure that the accused has the right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him." 7 Green explained that the
confrontation right was intended to accomplish three goals: (1) to insure
that the statement is given under oath, thereby impressing upon the wit-
ness the seriousness of the situation and the sanctions against perjury;
(2) to force the witness to be subjected to cross-examination; and (3) to
allow the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness which aids it in
assessing the witness' credibility."I8 Even if the out-of-court statement is
not subjected to these protections but the witness is present and testifies
at trial about the statement, the Court concluded that the statement re-
109. Id.
110. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
111. Id. at 164.
112. Id. at 151.
113. Id. at 152.
114. Id.
115. Id. California Evidence Code Section 1235 provides that "[e]vidence of a statement
made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent
with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770." CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1235 (Deering 1987). Section 770 requires that the witness be given an opportunity to
explain or deny the prior statement at some time in the trial. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 770
(Deering 1987).
116. Green, 399 U.S. at 164.
117. Id. at 157-58.
118. Id. at 158.
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gains its lost protections because the witness is under oath and subject to
cross-examination before the jury. 19
In the second part of the opinion, the Court held that admission of
preliminary hearing testimony satisfied the constitutional protections if
the testimony was taken under oath, the accused was represented by
counsel and counsel cross-examined the witness.12 ° The Court stated:
We... think that [the witness'] preliminary hearing testi-
mony was admissible as far as the Constitution is concerned
wholly apart from the question of whether respondent had an
effective opportunity for confrontation at the subsequent trial.
For [the witness'] statement at the preliminary hearing had al-
ready been given under circumstances closely approximating
those that surround the typical trial.12'
Since the witness' preliminary hearing testimony would have been
admissible had the witness been unavailable despite good faith efforts to
produce him, the Court reasoned that the testimony should be admitted
when the witness is actually produced.' 22 The Court stated:
[I]t is untenable to construe the Confrontation Clause to permit
the use of prior testimony to prove the State's case where the
declarant never appears, but to bar that testimony where the
declarant is present at the trial, exposed to the defendant and
the trier of fact, and subject to cross-examination.
123
The Court noted that it suggested this reasoning in Pointer v. Texas 1
24
when it said that the result would have been different had the witness'
statement been taken at a "full-fledged hearing" in which the defendant
had been represented by counsel who had an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness.'
25
Therefore, Green established: (1) that an out-of-court statement not
subject to any of the protections of the confrontation clause, which is
admitted for its truth, satisfies the confrontation requirement if the wit-
119. Id. at 158-59. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, criticized the equation of the
right of cross-examination with the meaning of confrontation. Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). He proposed that the critical element in the confrontation requirement was availability
of the witness. Harlan argued that the confrontation protection requires the production of a
witness when he is available to testify. Id. at 182-83 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing West v.
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904)). Harlan retreated from this position six months later in Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See infra note 156.
120. Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 166-67.
124. 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
125. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66.
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ness is produced at trial, testifies under oath and is subject to cross-exam-
ination before the trier of fact 2 6 and (2) if the witness is unavailable at
trial, the preliminary hearing testimony is admissible if given under oath
and subject to cross-examination. 2 7 Thus, Green deemphasized the dis-
tinction between preliminary hearing testimony and trial testimony
which Barber had recognized only two years earlier.
128
In Dutton v. Evans,129 a case decided only six months after Green,
the Court addressed another state evidentiary rule which the accused
claimed violated his confrontation rights. In Dutton, the state introduced
126. Id. at 158.
127. Id. at 165-68.
128. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that for purposes of the confrontation clause no
significant difference existed between a witness who fails to testify because he is unwilling to do
so, and a witness whose inability to remember silences his testimony. Brennan argued that in
both instances the jury may view the demeanor of the witness at trial. However, the purpose
of cross-examination which is crucial to the confrontation clause is not satisfied because the
witness cannot be questioned about pertinent facts contained in the out-of-court statements.
Id. at 193-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20
(1965)).
Brennan listed numerous reasons why examination at a preliminary hearing rarely ap-
proximates that of a trial, and therefore, does not satisfy the confrontation requirements. He
noted:
(1) The objective of the hearing is to establish whether probable cause exists, a much lighter
burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) Neither the defense nor the prosecution is anxious before trial to disclose its case by
extensive examination at the preliminary hearing;
(3) The schedules of both the court and counsel cannot accommodate lengthy preliminary
hearings;
(4) Even if no concern arises about schedules, generally neither the defense nor the prosecu-
tion has had an adequate opportunity to prepare extensive examination before the hearing;
(5) Even if extensive examination of the witnesses has occurred, the factfinder would receive
this information second hand so that the witness' demeanor, a significant factor in weighing
the testimony, would be lost;
(6) Since the atmosphere and stakes are different in the two proceedings, witnesses may be
more careless in their testimony at a preliminary hearing than at trial. Also, the witnesses may
be more willing to perjure themselves when the consequences are that the accused will stand
trial than when the consequences will condemn the accused to loss of freedom. Id. at 197-99
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan stated:
In short, [the majority] ignores reality to assume that the purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause are met during a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, to introduce prelimi-
nary hearing testimony for the truth of the facts asserted, when the witness is in court
and either unwilling or unable to testify regarding the pertinent events, denies the
accused his Sixth Amendment right to grapple effectively with incriminating
evidence.
Id. at 199 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, was joined by Justices
Burger, White and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Burger, filed a concurring
opinion. Justice Harlan filed an opinion concurring in the result. Justice Marshall, writing for
the dissent, was joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan. Id. at 75.
January 1988] CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY 557
a co-conspirator's statement made to the testifying witness under a state
hearsay exception.1 30 The defendant, Evans, and accomplice, Williams,
were charged with murder. 3 ' While the accomplice was in prison, a
fellow prisoner, Shaw, inquired how Williams had fared at his arraign-
ment. "'32 Williams responded, "[i]f it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-
bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."' 3 3 This statement was
admitted into evidence under a state hearsay exception at Evans' trial.1
34
Evans challenged the hearsay exception allowing the co-conspirator's ex-
trajudicial statements made during the concealment phase of a conspir-
acy to be admitted at trial.
t35
A plurality'36 held that according to the circumstances of the case,
the admission of the out-of-court statement did not violate the confronta-
tion clause.137 The Court focused on the reliability of Shaw rather than
on the fact that Williams had not been subject to confrontation by Ev-
ans. "'38 The Court, referring to Shaw's testimony, stated: "From the
viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to
cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of
fact, is a reliable informant not only as to what he has seen but also as to
130. Id. at 78.
131. Id. at 76.
132. Id. at 77.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 78. The Georgia statute provides that "[a]fter the fact of conspiracy shall be
proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal
project shall be admissible against all." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1981). This statute ex-
tended the co-conspirator exception to include statements made during the concealment phase
of the crime. The Federal Rules of Evidence restrict the exception to statements made "during
the course of" the conspiracy. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note.
The Advisory Committee noted that "[t]he limitation upon the admissibility of statements of
co-conspirators to those made 'during the course . . . of the conspiracy' is in the accepted
pattern." Id.
135. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80-83. The accused challenged the state hearsay exception on two
grounds. Id. First, he contended that the state rule was invalid under the confrontation clause
because it did not coincide with the narrower federal exception. Id. at 80. Second, he argued
that admission of the out-of-court declaration denied him the right to confront a witness
against him, in violation of the confrontation clause. Id. at 83.
136. Justice Harlan concurred with the plurality of four justices in denying that the ac-
cused's right of confrontation had been violated. Id. at 93 (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra
note 119.
137. Id. at 83. The Court held that the state hearsay exception is not invalid under the
confrontation clause merely because it does not coincide with the federal exception. Id. The
federal rules are a result of the Court's rule-making power in the area of federal evidence law
and do not emanate from the sixth amendment. Id. at 82-83. The Court also held that admis-
sion of noncrucial evidence in this case did not serve to deny the accused's confrontation right
because the out-of-court declarations bore "indicia of reliability." Id. at 87-89.
138. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88.
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what he has heard."'39
Although Shaw's out-of-court statement was admitted pursuant to
the state rule of evidence, the Court's evidentiary analysis "stood the law
of hearsay on its head."' 140 The Court took the unprecedented step of
declaring that a reliable informant may offer information for its truth
regarding what he has heard although the statement does not fall within
a judicially recognized hearsay exception. 4' The Court reasoned that
Shaw's testimony regarding Williams' statement which implicated the
defendant as the perpetrator of the murders was reliable because: (1) the
statement was not an assertion about a past fact and thus the jury would
be warned not to give it undue weight; (2) it had been "abundantly estab-
lished" that Williams had personal knowledge of the crime and its par-
ticipants; (3) it was extremely doubtful that Williams' statement was
founded on faulty recollection; and (4) the statement was spontaneous
and against Williams' penal interest. 42 These factors were considered
"indicia of reliability," allowing Shaw's statement about what he heard
to be admitted for its truth, even though Williams had not been con-
fronted by Evans. 4 3 The Court established that noncrucial hearsay pos-
sessing sufficient "indicia of reliability ... may be placed before the jury
though there is no confrontation of the declarant."'" Thus, the Court
completely shifted its focus away from the availability of the declarant
and the requirement of cross-examination.
Distinguishing Dutton from previous cases such as Pointer,"' Doug-
las14 6 and Barber, 14 7 the Court noted that the evidence was neither "cru-
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 43, 51 (1975).
141. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88. Professor Louis Natali, strongly criticizing Justice Stewart's
statement that a reliable informant may offer information for its truth regarding what he has
heard, wrote:
This incredible redefining of the hearsay rule was accomplished without a single cita-
tion to history, precedent or commentary. Justice Stewart blithely ignored the pur-
pose for which the statement was offered. The statement, offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted therein, was hearsay and could only be admitted under some
judicially approved exception that guaranteed its trustworthiness.... His [Stewart's]
reasoning would let in any hearsay, pursuant to a state exception, that satisfied the
requirements of (1) an oath, (2) cross-examination and (3) jury observation of de-
meanor. Justice Stewart is plainly wrong. The hearsay rule demands that the declar-
ant be present in court unless the court has recognized an exception to the rule.
Natali, supra note 140, at 51-52 (footnotes omitted).
142. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.
143. Id. at 89.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
146. 380 U.S. 415 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 78-91.
147. 390 U.S. 719 (1968); see supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
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cial" nor "devastating" as it had been in the other cases.' 4 8 The Court
stated that "no less than 20 witnesses appeared and testified for the pros-
ecution" and the defendant's counsel was "given full opportunity to
cross-examine every one of them."' 4 9 The focus was on the triviality of
the testimony.' 51 Shaw's testimony was "of peripheral significance at
most."'' Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, stated that if er-
ror exists, it was harmless error.
152
Apparently abandoning the confrontation protection to defendants
in cases where the witness' testimony bore "indicia of reliability" and the
out-of-court statement was not crucial to the prosecution's case, the
Court reduced the constitutional protection to a practical matter for de-
termining the truth. The Court stated: "[T]he mission of the Confronta-
tion Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the
truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of
fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment.' "'"" Thus, in Dutton, the Court retreated from its earlier position
that the confrontation clause bars uncross-examined hearsay from avail-
able declarants. 154 Dutton found no confrontation violation in the admis-
sion of a hearsay statement made by a co-conspirator inculpating the
defendant even though the declarant was not cross-examined at trial or
at a preliminary hearing.155 There was no mention of whether the prose-
cution had sought to obtain the presence of the co-conspirator. 56 Ap-
148. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 90, 93 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Professor Natali wrote:
The Court distinguished [prior] cases from Dutton in a manner that permitted the
harmless error tail to wag the sixth amendment dog. It noted at the outset that the
evidence at issue in this case was neither "crucial" nor "devastating." ... The plu-
rality sought to bolster its backdoor reasoning by emphasizing ... that the evidence
was only of "peripheral significance." The harmless error test was transparently in
control, as evidenced by the emphasis on the content of the testimony under the veil
of a constitutional analysis of admissibility.
Natali, supra note 140, at 50-51 (footnotes omitted).
153. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
154. The Court established in Barber v. Page that for purposes of the confrontation clause, a
witness is not "unavailable" unless the prosecution has made a good faith effort to obtain his
presence at trial. 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
155. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.
156. Justice Harlan retreated from his position in Green, finding that the confrontation
clause was designed to establish the rule that available witnesses must be presented at trial.
399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring). He stated that this analysis of the confrontation
clause would "significantly curtail development of the law of evidence to eliminate the neces-
sity for production of declarants where production would be unduly inconvenient and of small
utility to the defendant." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 95-96 (Harlan, J., concurring). He noted that
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parently, the Court gave a flexible interpretation to the confrontation
clause by taking into account the specific circumstances of the case,
rather than by relying on the principles it had previously announced in
Pointer,'7 Douglas 58 and Barber."5 9
B. Ohio v. Roberts
In 1980, ten years after California v. Green 6 ' and Dutton v. Ev-
ans,16 1 the Court in Ohio v. Roberts'62 clearly established the sweeping
requirement of declarant unavailability for admission of an out-of-court
statement at trial.'63 In Roberts, the accused was charged with check
forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. 6" Roberts claimed he had
been given a friend's parents' checkbook and credit cards with the under-
standing that he was permitted to use them.'65 At a preliminary hearing
in which the friend was called as a defense witness, counsel for Roberts
asserted through leading questions that the witness had permitted Rob-
erts to use the checks and credit cards.'66 The witness denied this asser-
tion. 167 The prosecution did not cross-examine the witness. 168 Since the
witness' whereabouts were unknown by family and friends, the witness
could not be produced at trial despite the fact that the state had sub-
poened her five times at her parent's residence.169 The prosecution, rely-
ing on a state statute 17 which permitted the use of preliminary hearing
this interpretation would eliminate hearsay exceptions such as business records, official state-
ments, learned treatises and trade reports. Id. at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
stated that the confrontation clause was not well designed for analyzing the constitutionality of
rules of evidence. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). He offered that federal and state rules of evi-
dence should be tested in accordance with the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 96-97 (Harlan, J., concurring).
157. 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
158. 380 U.S. 415 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 78-91.
159. 390 U.S. 719 (1968); see supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
160. 399 U.S. 149 (1970); see supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
161. 400 U.S. 74 (1970); see supra notes 129-59 and accompanying text.
162. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see supra notes 162-87 and accompanying text.
163. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
164. Id. at 58.
165. Id. at 59.
166. Id. at 58.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 59.
170. Id. at 59 n.2. The statute provides:
Testimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hearing at which the defendant
is present, or at a former trial of the cause, or taken by deposition at the instance of
the defendant or the state, may be used whenever the witness giving such testimony
dies, or cannot for any reason be produced at the trial, or whenever the witness has,
since giving such testimony, become incapacitated to testify. If such former testi-
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testimony when the witness could not be produced at trial, offered the
transcript of the witness' testimony.171 The trial court admitted the tran-
script into evidence. 172 Defense counsel claimed this violated the ac-
cused's confrontation rights.
173
Relying on Mattox v. United States,174 the Roberts Court held that
the confrontation clause envisions personal examination and cross-exam-
ination of the witness. 175 The Court established a two-prong test to de-
termine when hearsay statements may be admitted.176 The first prong of
the test normally requires a showing of unavailability of the declarant.
177
Roberts noted that the basic litmus test for unavailability is a "good faith
effort" on the part of the prosecutorial authorities. 178 The Court stated:
mony is contained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated transcript of such
testimony, it shall be proven by the bill of exceptions, or transcript, otherwise by
other testimony.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (1975).
171. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59.
172. Id. at 60.
173. Id. at 59. The Ohio Court of Appeal reversed the conviction on the basis that the
prosecution had not made a "good faith effort" to secure the presence of the witness. Id. at 60.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on another ground. Id. The court held that the
transcript violated the defendant's confrontation rights because the witness had not been cross-
examined by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 60-62.
174. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
175. 448 U.S. at 63-64 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
176. Id. at 65.
177. Id. The Court, relying on Dutton, noted that a demonstration of unavailability is not
always required. Id. at 65 n.7. For example, unavailability is not required if the court finds
the utility of trial confrontation to be sufficiently remote. Id. (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970)). However, the Court failed to formulate any standards for determining when the
unavailability requirement is excused.
This rule of unavailability appears to be the position Justice Harlan embraced in Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), but abandoned only six
months later in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970). See supra notes 110-28 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Green and notes 129-59 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Dutton. In his concurring opinion in Green, Justice Harlan wrote that "the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment... require[s] the prosecution to produce any available witness
whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial." Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original). However in Dutton, Justice Harlan said that he was not
content with the position he had taken in Green. He wrote that "[a] rule requiring production
of available witnesses would significantly curtail development of the law of evidence to elimi-
nate the necessity for production of declarants where production would be unduly inconve-
nient and of small utility to a defendant." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 95-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
178. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)). The
Court, recognizing that it had not refined this rule in earlier cases, stated general propositions
that emerge from the rule. The Court said that the law does not require that futile acts be
taken. Id. Therefore, if no possibility exists of procuring the witness' presence, "good faith"
does not demand anything of the prosecution. Id. However, if a possibility exists, even re-
mote, that actions taken may produce the declarant, then the obligation of good faith may
demand that the prosecution take action. Id. The question of "good faith efforts" is one of
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"[I]n conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusa-
tion, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity.... [T]he pros-
ecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant."' 79
The second prong-requiring a statement to possess "indicia of reli-
ability"-operates only once the declarant is shown to be unavailable.8
The Court, recognizing that hearsay rules and the confrontation clause
were designed to protect similar values and stemmed from the same
roots, held that "[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."''
Having established the two-prong test, Roberts held that the preliminary
hearing testimony was admissible because the witness was unavailable' 82
and the statement bore indicia of reliability. 83 The Court found that the
questioning of the witness in Roberts comported with the form and pur-
pose of cross-examination. 18 4 Defense counsel's questioning on direct-
examination took on the form of cross-examination because his question-
ing was "replete with leading questions."' 85 The examination comported
with the purpose of cross-examination by challenging the witness' truth-
fulness. 86 Thus, the Court said that the questioning of the witness, re-
gardless of whether it was on direct or cross-examination, complied with
the purpose behind the confrontation clause.'
87
The two-prong test announced in Ohio v. Roberts established a bal-
ance between the competing interests of the confrontation clause and the
law of hearsay. Roberts appeared to put to rest the almost century long
uncertainty regarding when an out-of-court statement may be admitted
absent the declarant. Against this background, the United States v. Inadi
decision is analyzed.
reasonableness, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating that it has made a
reasonable effort. Id. at 74-75.
179. Id. at 65.
180. Id. at 66.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 75.
183. Id. at 73.
184. Id. at 70-71.
185. Id. Cross-examination, in contrast to direct-examination, is often conducted by lead-
ing questions. The main purpose of cross-examination is to weaken direct testimony and usu-
ally the witness is presumed to be uncooperative. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at 50.
186. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71.
187. Id. at 70-71.
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
In United States v. Inadi,'88 the Supreme Court held that the con-
frontation clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a condi-
tion to admission of a co-conspirator's out-of-court declarations.189 The
majority 9 ° rejected the court of appeals' reliance on Ohio v. Roberts' 9'
for the proposition that "the prosecution must either produce, or demon-
strate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use
against the defendant."' 92 The Inadi Court cautioned that the Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Roberts would mean that "no out-of-court state-
ment would be admissible without a showing of unavailability."' 93 The
Court stated that this interpretation would effectuate a "wholesale revi-
sion of the law of evidence" and would too broadly interpret the confron-
tation clause.' 94 The majority in Inadi disclaimed any intention in
Roberts of proposing a general rule of unavailability.' 95 The Court an-
nounced that the unavailability rule set forth in Roberts applied only to
prior judicial proceedings.' 96 The Court stated:
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it an-
swered, the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these
indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule...
that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony. Roberts
cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that
no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government
without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.' 97
The Inadi Court reasoned that the unavailability requirement was
inapplicable to co-conspirators' extrajudicial statements by distinguish-
ing co-conspirators' statements from former testimony.' 98 Focusing on
the similarities between prior testimony and live testimony, the Court
188. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986). See supra notes 19-52 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the facts of United States v. Inadi.
189. 106 S. Ct. at 1129.
190. Justice Powell wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting
opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 1123.
191. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra notes 11-15, 162-87 and accompanying text.
192. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1125 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
193. Id. at 1125.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 1126-27.
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found that former testimony was merely a "weaker substitute for live
testimony." '99 Consequently, the Court stated that when a party may
present either former testimony or live testimony, the "better evidence"
is the live testimony which can be cross-examined before the trier of
fact.2°° However, the Inadi Court found that the same principles do not
apply to co-conspirators' out-of-court statements.2 0 1 The Inadi Court fo-
cused on the qualitative difference between statements made during the
conspiracy and testimony at trial which gives the extrajudicial statements
independent evidentiary value.2"2 Noting that the relationship between
the co-conspirators will have changed substantially between the time the
relationship was formed and trial, the Court stated:
Conspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to
each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testify-
ing on the witness stand.
• ..The declarant and the defendant will have changed
from partners in an illegal conspiracy to suspects or defendants
in a criminal trial, each with information potentially damaging
to the other .... [I]t is extremely unlikely that in-court testi-
mony will recapture the evidentiary significance of statements
made when the conspiracy was operating in full force.20 3
Several reasons were given for finding little value in requiring un-
availability as an element of the co-conspirator exception. First, the
Court stated that out-of-court statements of co-conspirators are admissi-
ble whether the declarants are available and produced by the prosecution
or unavailable. 2°4 The Court stated that if the co-conspirator declarants
are in fact unavailable, their out-of-court statements are admissible.20 5
In Inadi, the extrajudicial statements of William Levan, 20 6 an unindicted
co-conspirator, were admissible because he invoked his fifth amendment
privilege and thereby rendered himself unavailable.20 7 If the co-conspira-
tor declarants are available and produced at trial, their out-of-court state-
199. Id. at 1126.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1126-27.
204. Id. at 1127. The Court did not cite any support for this "reason." Apparently, the
Court's reasons are actually conclusions which it has drawn.
205. Id. See supra note 14 for the Federal Rules of Evidence definition of unavailability.
See infra text accompanying notes 316-41 for a discussion of the Court's reasoning.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
207. A witness' exercise of a privilege not to testify renders the witness unavailable to the
extent of the scope of the privilege. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at 754. See FED. R. Evil).
804(a)(1), see supra note 14 for the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a).
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ments are admissible. The Inadi Court found that the extrajudicial
statements of Michael McKeon2" 8 and Marianne Lazaro, 20 9 two co-con-
spirators who testified under immunity, were admissible because they
were available and produced at trial2 10 Therefore, the Court ruled that
the unavailability rule does not exclude co-conspirator's extrajudicial
declarations unless the prosecution errs in failing to produce an available
declarant.1
Second, the Court reasoned that an unavailability rule would not
likely produce significant testimony from co-conspirators that would
contribute to the "truth determining process" because declarants impor-
tant to the prosecution or defense already will have been subpoenaed. 1 2
The Court noted that only those declarants which neither side thought
would be helpful would not have been called.2 13 The Court indicated
that John Lazaro, 4 an unindicted co-conspirator, was in this latter posi-
tion since neither the prosecution nor the defense subpoenaed him as a
witness.215 In a footnote, the Court observed that probably neither side
wanted Lazaro to testify.216 The prosecution may not have wanted to
call Lazaro because he may have been facing indictment or trial, and
would have had little incentive to help them.2 17 The defense may not
have wanted to subpoena Lazaro because his interests no longer coin-
cided with Inadi's.2 1  Each could.expose information that was harmful
to the other."1 9 The Court noted the fact that Inadi did nothing to secure
Lazaro's testimony and had several options available to attack Lazaro's
extrajudicial statements.220 Inadi pointed out that under Federal Rule of
Evidence 806,21 the defendant could have attacked the credibility of
208. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
209. See supra text accompanying note 31-35.
210. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127.
211. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 316-17 for a discussion of the Court's reasoning.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 25-46.
215. mnadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127.
216. Id. at 1127 n.7.
217. Id. at 1126.
218. Id. at 1127 n.7.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1127.
221. Rule 806 provides:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),(C),(D), or (E),
has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if
attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness .... If the party against whom a
hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is
entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.
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Lazaro by any evidence that would have been admissible if Lazaro had
testified.222 Also, if Inadi chose to call Lazaro as a witness, Inadi would
have been entitled under Rule 806 to examine Lazaro as if under cross-
examination.223 The defendant would not have had to establish that
Lazaro was a hostile witness, although that option was available to
him.224 The Court also noted that the compulsory process clause of the
sixth amendment 225 would have aided Inadi in obtaining the testimony of
any witness in his favor.226 Thus, the Court concluded that if the prose-
cution does not want to call a co-conspirator declarant and the defense
does not choose to subpoena a co-conspirator declarant as either a
favorable or hostile witness, then little is gained by a rule requiring the
prosecution to make the declarant available before admitting his extraju-
dicial statements.227
Third, the Inadi Court contrasted the few benefits of an unavailabil-
ity rule for the co-conspirator exception to the large burden it would
place on the criminal justice system. 28 The Court stated that "[a] con-
stitutional rule requiring a determination of availability every time the
prosecution seeks to introduce a co-conspirator's declaration automati-
cally adds another avenue of appellate review in these complex cases."
229
The Court recognized that since the co-conspirator rule is such a fre-
quently used exception230 to the hearsay rule, a requirement of determin-
ing the declarant's availability would "impose a substantial burden on
FED. R. EVID. 806.
222. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127-28.
223. Id.; see supra note 185.
224. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127-28. The trial court has the discretion to decide whether t
witness is "hostile," thereby giving counsel the right to cross-examine his own witness. Com-
monwealth v. Barber, 418 A.2d 653, 657 (1980). The following requirements must be met for
counsel to cross-examine his own witness: (1) the witness' testimony must be unexpected:
(2) the testimony must contradict previous statements made by the witness; (3) the testimony
must harm the party calling the witness and benefit the opposing side; and (4) the scope of the
cross-examination may not be excessive. Commonwealth v. Barber, 418 A.2d at 657 (1980).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3. The clause reads as follows: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor .... "
226. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1128; see infra text accompanying notes 326-33.
227. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1128. The Court's rationale appears to be a guise for its conclu-
sions. See infra text accompanying notes 316-41 for an analysis of the Court's "reasoning."
228. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1128.
229. Id.
230. In a footnote, the Court noted that co-conspirator's out-of-court statements are char-
acterized in Federal Rule of Evidence 801 as exemptions from, rather than exceptions to, the
hearsay rule. Id. at 1128 n.12. The Court stated that regardless of their characterization, the
same confrontation clause principles apply. Id.; see supra note 3.
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the entire criminal justice system."23'
Finally, the Court reasoned that with the co-conspirator exception,
the unavailability rule placed a significant burden on the prosecution
because it would have to identify and locate each declarant, and then
keep track of them to ensure their availability at trial.2 32 Inadi stated
that in situations in which co-conspirators are incarcerated, the require-
ment of producing them at trial burdens prison officials and increases the
risk of escapes.2 33 Therefore, from a practical standpoint, the unavaila-
bility rule would greatly burden the prosecution and only marginally
benefit the defendant.23 4
Inadi pointed out that the defendant's confrontation argument re-
quired the Court to readdress the issue of the admissibility of co-conspir-
ator's extrajudicial statements which had been raised in Dutton v.
Evans,235 another co-conspirator case. The Inadi Court indicated that
the Dutton plurality236 found that the accused's confrontation right had
not been violated by admitting the co-conspirator's extrajudicial state-
ment into evidence even though the co-conspirator declarant was not
produced at trial.23 7 Inadi stated that it would continue to decline to
require a showing of the declarant's unavailability as a condition to ad-
mitting the extrajudicial statements.23 8
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the majority's hold-
ing that the unavailability rule was not applicable to co-conspirators' out-
of-court statements.23 9 Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, criti-
cized the majority in a four-part analysis. In the first part, the dissent
attacked the majority's position that Ohio v. Roberts240 two-prong test of
unavailability and reliability was limited to prior judicial testimony.24'
The dissenting opinion, quoting Justice Blackmun's affirmance of the re-
quirements of unavailability and reliability in Roberts, stated that "[t]he
Court has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause
231. Id. at 1128.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1129.
235. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See supra notes 129-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Dutton v. Evans.
236. See supra note 129.
237. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1129.
238. Id.
239. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1125-26 (1986).
240. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
241. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1129-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that would determine the validity of all ... hearsay "exceptions."' But a
general approach to the problem is discernible. '242 Justice Marshall
noted that in Roberts, the Court had reviewed many earlier cases con-
struing the relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay
exceptions before announcing its rule that "the Sixth Amendment estab-
lishes a rule of necessity .... [T]he prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant., 243 Justice Marshall wrote that
"[t]his sweeping language was in no way limited to any particular variety
of out-of-court declarations .... [The majority's] effort to confine Rob-
erts misconstrues both the meaning of that decision and the essential
command of the Confrontation Clause.
' 244
The dissent argued that co-conspirators' extrajudicial statements ad-
mitted for their truth are not so inherently reliable that cross-examina-
tion is unnecessary to guarantee their trustworthiness. 2 5 Agreeing with
the majority that co-conspirators will speak differently to each other
while engaged in the conspiracy than when testifying in court, 46 the
dissent urged that this difference "cannot possibly be a guarantee, or even
an indicium, of [the out-of-court statements'] reliability.
2 47
Since criminals are not "notorious for their veracity" in dealing with
each other, the dissent reasoned that co-conspirators' statements made in
the course of the conspiracy are often unreliable.2 48 Justice Marshall
wrote that co-conspirators' extrajudicial statements are unreliable not
only because of the "duplicity with which criminals often conduct their
business" but also because "ambiguities ... appear in all casual conversa-
tions. 2 49 Reasoning that co-conspirators' out-of-court statements are
even more likely to be plagued with ambiguities because co-conspirators
often speak in slang and use private codes, the dissent advocated the ap-
pearance of co-conspirators in court to afford the prosecution and the
defense the opportunity to eliminate ambiguities.2
242. Id. at 1130 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. at 56, 64-65 (1980)).
243. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
244. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 1131-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1131 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 1159, 1166 (1954)).
249. Id. at 1132 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Note, Federal Rule Of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) And
The Confrontation Clause: Closing The Window Of Adnissibility For Coconspirator Hearsay,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291 (1985); Comment, Testing The Reliability Of Coconspirators'
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The dissent further doubted the reliability of co-conspirators' state-
ments by pointing out that unlike many other types of statements ex-
cepted from the rule due to their reliability,25" ' the co-conspirator
exception is not based on the belief that these statements are inherently
reliable.252 Rather, the exception is based on the "agency theory" which
posits that once the conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator
in furtherance of the conspiracy is attributable to all and may be used as
evidence against each member.253 The dissent indicated that the agency
theory has been discarded as "at best a fiction." '254 Thus, the co-conspir-
ator exception does not serve to further the confrontation clause's goal of
placing reliable information before the trier of fact.
255
In the second part of the analysis, the dissent did not disagree with
the majority that co-conspirators' out-of-court statements are qualita-
tively different than co-conspirator's statements made at trial.256 How-
ever, the dissent asserted that this fact should not exclude co-
conspirators' extrajudicial statements from the requirement of unavaila-
bility and reliability.257 Justice Marshall observed:
I truly cannot understand the majority's fear that a rule
requiring the prosecution to do its best to produce a co-conspir-
ator declarant in court would somehow deprive triers of fact of
valuable evidence.... The majority's fear must ... stem from a
notion that if the prosecution is able to produce the declarant in
court, his presence will somehow prevent the jury from hearing
the truth.2
The dissent pointed out that even with the unavailability require-
ment, declarants' out-of-court statements would still be admissible as
long as the prosecution made a good faith effort to produce the declarant,
and as long as the statements possessed adequate "indicia of reliabil-
ity." '259 Justice Marshall argued that the requirement of producing de-
clarants would add to, rather than inhibit, the truth determining process
Statements Admitted Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Putting The Claws Back
In The Confrontation Clause, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1565 (1985).
251. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1132 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. Id.
253. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
460, 469 (1827)).
254. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Advisory Committee on Fed. Rule Evid.
801 (d)(2)(E)).
255. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
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by requiring declarants to affirm, deny or qualify their out-of-court state-
ments.2 60 Therefore, according to the dissent, applying the unavailability
rule to co-conspirators' extrajudicial statements would not destroy their
value as substantive evidence.26' Justice Marshall wrote that "[w]hatever
truth is contained in [the declarants'] extrajudicial declarations cannot be
lost.,,
262
In the third part, the dissent criticized the majority's reasoning that
because the defendant may always call the co-conspirator declarant as
his own witness under the compulsory process clause,263 the prosecution
need not produce the declarant.2 6" The dissent asserted that the confron-
tation clause provides a defendant with the right to be confronted with a
witness against him, not merely the opportunity to compel witnesses of
his own.26 5
Aside from the theoretical problems posed by the majority's conten-
tion that the defendant may call the co-conspirator declarant, the dissent
maintained that this reasoning shifts the "significant practical burden" of
identifying co-conspirators' statements to the defendant. 266 The dissent
argued that even using the "agency theory" 267 of imputing to the defend-
ant the actions of co-conspirators, the accused may not know all the per-
sons in a complex conspiracy. 26' As between the prosecution and the
defense, the dissent argued that "the prosecution is in a better position to
identify [members of the conspiracy] and to initiate their production
.... .1269 Thus, the prosecution should have the burden of identifying
and calling witnesses whose extrajudicial statements the prosecution
wishes to use against the accused.
Asserting that the tactical advantages to the defendant would be lost
if the defendant had to call the declarant as his or her own witness, the
dissent stated that the right to impeach the co-conspirator declarant
under Federal Rul of Evidence 806270 is not equivalent to the right to
iromediately cross-examine the declarant when called as the prosecution
260. Id. at 1133 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
263. See supra note 225 and accompanying text and infra notes 324-33 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the compulsory process clause.
264. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1133-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 1133 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 1133-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
268. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1133-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Westen, Confrontation and Contpulsorv
Process: 4 Unified Theory of Evidencefor Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. Ri:v. 567. 616 (1978)).
270. See supra note 221 for text of Rule 806.
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witness.2 7I The dissent argued that if the prosecution is allowed to intro-
duce the extrajudicial statements absent the declarant, the only cross-
examination will be of the person who recorded them.27 Inquiry into
the reliability of the declarations will not be made until the defense calls
the co-conspirator.273 Thus, the time elapsing between the introduction
of the statements and the "cross-examination" 74 of the declarant may be
so substantial that the statements will remain unrebutted in the jurors'
minds.2 75 For example, the dissent observed that in complex conspiracy
trials, the statements may remain unrebutted for weeks. 76 In addition, if
the defendant calls the declarant as a defense witness, this may bolster
the jurors' perceptions of the conspiratorial relationship between the de-
fendant and witness, even if the witness has been certified as hostile by
the court.2 7
The dissent also recognized an additional disadvantage to the de-
fendant in federal prosecutions. A defendant calling his or her own wit-
ness has no statutory right to obtain prior statements of the witness in the
government's possession because the defendant is given that right only
after the witness has testified on direct examination. 278 Hence, the dis-
sent asserted that the majority's reliance on the defendant's right to com-
pulsory process deprived the defendant of critical advantages which the
confrontation clause provides.279
In the last part of the analysis, the dissent criticized the majority's
reasoning that the defendant's constitutional rights should be
subordinated to concerns about prosecutorial efficiency. 2 0 Recalling
271. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes
334-37.
272. Id.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 333-37.
274. Rule 806 provides that "[i]f the party against whom a hearsay statement had been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement
as if under cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 806,
275. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982)). Section 3500(a)
provides:
Demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or re-
port in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness
or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of
subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examina-
tion in the trial of the case.
See also infra text accompanying note 338-39.
279. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that the confrontation clause may have been spurred by Sir Walter Ra-
leigh's conviction which had been based on recanted depositions of an
alleged accomplice, Justice Marshall wrote:
[Tihe Framers.. . would surely have been as apprehensive of
the spectacle of a defendant's conviction upon the testimony of
a handful of surveillance technicians and a very large box of
tapes recording the boasts, faulty recollections, and coded or
ambiguous utterances of outlaws. The Court's decision helps
clear the way for this spectable [sic] to become a common
occurence.
281
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. Scope of Ohio v. Roberts
In United States v. Inadi,282 the Court significantly narrowed the
two-prong test established in Oio v. Roberts,28 3 requiring a showing of
unavailability and reliability284 as a condition for admission of out-of-
court statements absent the declarant.2 85 The Inadi Court wrote that
"Roberts itself disclaimed any intention of proposing a general answer to
the many difficult questions arising out of the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay." '286 Further, the Court stated that
"Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to questions not
presented in that case .... 287 However, the language of Roberts contra-
dicts these statements.
In Roberts, the defendant challenged the admission of testimony
given at a prior judicial hearing.28 8 The Roberts Court, canvassing the
history of the relationship between the confrontation clause and hear-
say289 found that "[t]he Court has emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and
that 'a primary interest ... is the right of cross-examination.' "2" How-
ever, the Court acknowledged that the competing interests of public pol-
icy and the necessities of the case may justify dispensing with a
281. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
282. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
283. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
284. Id. at 65-66.
285. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1125-26.
286. Id. at 1125.
287. Id.
288. Roberts, 448 U.S. 59. See supra notes 11-15 and 162-87 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case.
289. Id. at 62-64.
290. Id. at 63 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)(footnote omitted)).
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defendant's confrontation right at trial.2 91 After recognizing these com-
peting interests, the Roberts Court announced that it would not seek to
" 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine
the validity of all ... hearsay exceptions' "292 but stated that "a general
approach to the problem is discernible. 2 193 This language does not con-
fine itself to addressing merely the prior testimony exception. The Inadi
Court's finding that Roberts should be read as merely reaffirming a long-
standing rule that the unavailability requirement applies only to prior
testimony294 is not supported by the very language of Roberts.
Roberts sets out an analytical framework which on its face seems to
clearly apply to all hearsay exceptions that do not require the declarant
to be available. 295  The Roberts Court announced the following two-
prong test:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways
to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conform-
ance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation,
the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity .... [T]he
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavaila-
bility of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against
the defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be
unavailable.... Even then, [the] statement is admissible only if
it bears adequate "indicia of reliability. 2296
291. Id. at 64.
292. Id. at 64-65 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
293. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
294. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1126.
295. The Federal Rules of Evidence divide the hearsay exceptions into two categories.
Under the 24 exceptions found in rule 803, the availability of the declarant is immaterial. FED.
R. EvID. 803. The advisory committee's note to rule 803 provides in pertinent part:
The ... rule [803] proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circum-
stances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though
he may be available. The theory finds vast support in the many exceptions to the
hearsay rule developed by the common law in which unavailability of the declarant is
not a relevant factor.
FED. R. EvID. 803, advisory committee's note.
Rule 804, with its five hearsay exceptions, requires the declarant to be unavailable prior to
admitting the hearsay statement. FED. R. EVID. 804. See note 14 for a definition of unavaila-
bility. Whereas rule 803 is based on the belief that hearsay statements falling within one of its
exceptions possesses circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the exceptions under rule
804 are based on the belief that if the declarant is unavailable, and if the hearsay meets speci-
fied quality, the hearsay is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant. FED.
R. EVID. 804, advisory committee's note.
296. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
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It is difficult to conceive how the Inadi Court construed this language to
limit the Roberts two-prong analysis to prior testimony.2 97 The Inadi
Court's assertion that Roberts disclaimed any intention of proposing a
general rule to the relationship between the confrontation clause and the
hearsay exception is plainly wrong. The language which the Inadi Court
selected to suggest that Roberts limited its scope to prior testimony is
misleading. Inadi correctly stated that Roberts did not seek to establish a
theory of the confrontation clause that would " 'determine the validity of
all ... hearsay exceptions' "298 but failed to note that Roberts did an-
nounce that "a general approach ... is discernible.,
299
One commentator has suggested that the Roberts Court did not rec-
ognize the sweeping ramifications of the unavailability requirement. 30°
The Roberts two-prong test did have a profound impact on criminal tri-
als, by restricting the prosecutorial use of numerous hearsay exceptions
which had traditionally been available to the government. 30 ' But the In-
adi Court would have been far more honest by directly addressing the
impact of Roberts and perhaps limiting its holding to prior testimony.
Instead the Inadi Court claimed that Roberts was never meant as a gen-
eral approach to the confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions.
30 2
B. Reliability of Co-Conspirators' Declarations
The Court in United States v. Inadi 303 reasoned that the unavailabil-
297. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1125-26 (1986).
298. Id. at 1125 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980)) (citing California v,
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)) (emphasis added).
299. 448 U.S. at 64-65 (emphasis added). Although Inadi claimed that Roberts did not
offer a general approach to the competing interests between the confrontation clause and hear-
say, the Court's recent discussion of Roberts in Bourjaily v. United States, 55 U.S.L.W. 4962
(1987) appears to conflict with Inadi, the Bourjaily Court, referring to Roberts, stated:
[We have attempted to harmonize the goal of the [Confrontation] Clause ... with a
societal interest in accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-
court statements. To accommodate these competing interests, the Court has, as a
general matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate both the unavailability
of the declarant and the "indicia of reliability" surrounding the out-of-court declar-
ant. ...
The Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts laid down only "a general approach to
the problem" of reconcilling hearsay exceptions with the Confrontation Clause.
55 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4965 (1987) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1980)). These
statements contradict Inadi's contention that the two-prong test announced in Roberts applied
only to preliminary hearing testimony and did not attempt to set out a general approach to the
conflict between the confrontation clause and hearsay. 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1125 (1986).
300. Kirkpatrick, supra note 9, at 660-68; Lilly, supra note 9, at 225.
301. See supra note 15.
302. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1125-26.
303. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
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ity rule is inapplicable to co-conspirator's extrajudicial statements.3° In-
adi stated that "[c]onspirators are likely to speak differently when talking
to each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on
the witness stand. 3 °5 The Court's observation is probably correct. Tes-
timony in court will rarely, if ever, recapture the evidentiary significance
of declarations made while a conspiracy is in progress. The extrajudicial
statements are "usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence." 30 6 But
the fact that conspirators speak differently during the conspiracy, than at
trial does not depreciate the value of either the in-court or out-of-court
declarations. The Inadi Court seems to fear that producing the co-con-
spirator declarant at trial will somehow destroy the extrajudical state-
ments as substantive evidence.30 7 However, contrary to this concern,
cross-examinination of a co-conspirator will only enhance the "truth-de-
termining process, ' ' 3° 8 for cross-examination gives the trier of fact the
opportunity to hear the declarant's answers under cross-examination and
to observe his demeanor.
The Inadi Court's failure to apply the Ohio v. Roberts30 9 two-prong
analysis allows the prosecution to admit the co-conspirator's extrajudi-
cial declarations for the truth of the matters asserted without requiring
even the slightest effort of the prosecution to produce the declarant. The
Court's focus on the qualitative difference between the extrajudicial state-
ment and in-court testimony does not address a crucial issue which is the
reliability of the statements.
Although Inadi stated that "[tihe reliability of the out-of-court
statements is not at issue in this case," '31 the Court appeared tc believe
that co-conspirators' extrajudicial statements provide reliable evidence
which "cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same
matters in court.",3 11 But the Court fails to support this notion. Co-
conspirator's extrajudicial statements are not inherently reliable. In fact,
the opposite appears to be true.31 2 Numerous commentators have noted
the lack of trustworthiness in co-conspirators' declarations. 13 One com-
304. Id. at 1126.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1127.
307. Id. at 1132 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
308. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
309. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
310. Id. at 1124 n.3.
311. Id. at 1126.
312. See supra notes 245-55 and accompanying text.
313. See Note, supra note 250, at 1310-12; Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the
Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1378, 1384-91 (1972); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 Micn. L. REV. 1159, 1165-66 (1954).
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mentator wrote:
Because they have a special incentive to shift blame to one an-
other, coconspirators are likely to bend the truth of their state-
ments. They are also likely to speak in code words or names
that make the identification of their meaning or subject matter
ambiguous. Because the nature of conspiracy requires sharing
of information only on a 'need to know' basis, a coconspirator
may be unaware of facets of a conspiracy beyond his own par-
ticular role, and may misperceive the roles of others.
31 4
Thus, the fact that a statement was made during the course of a conspir-
acy does not guarantee its reliability. Requiring the prosecution to make
a good faith effort to produce the co-conspirator declarant will further
advance the truth, the goal of the confrontation clause.
C. Value of an Unavailability Rule
Reasoning that an unavailability rule has little value since the state-
ments may be admitted if the declarant is either unavailable or is avail-
able and produced by the prosecution,315 Inadi indicated that the
unavailability rule "does not actually serve to exclude anything unless
the prosecution makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise avail-
able witness. ' 316 However, this is precisely the point of the unavailabil-
ity rule. Without this rule, the prosecution is free to build a case based
on co-conspirator hearsay which is devastating to the defendant. As one
commentator noted:
[T]he purpose of [the unavailability] rule is to force the
prosecutor to put forward the best case he has against the de-
fendant. There is something innately unfair and reminiscent of
trial by affidavit in a process that allows the prosecutor to build
a case with hearsay, while the defendant is forced to scramble
about and exhaust his own, often scarce resources to attempt to
produce the declarants .... [T]he co-conspirator declarant is a
particularly vital and involved witness.... The danger of unre-
liability in such cases is especially great.
31 7
The Court's assertion that the unavailability rule is unlikely to pro-
duce much useful testimony presumes that only those declarants who
neither side thinks will be helpful will not have been called as wit-
314. Note, supra note 250, at 1311-12 (footnotes omitted).
315. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1127 (1986).
316. Id.
317. Davenport, supra note 313, at 1403 (footnote omitted).
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nesses.31 s This assertion ignores the real reason why the co-conspirator
declarant is not subpoenaed by either the defense or the prosecution-
neither side wants him.319 The declarant is not sought by the prosecu-
tion or the defense because he is in a position of damaging both cases.320
The co-conspirator and the defendant are no longer partners in a crime,
but potential witnesses against each other with damaging information.
The prosecution and the declarant are also at odds since the prosecution
is likely to seek the conspirator's indictment. 321 Absent the unavailabil-
ity rule, the prosecution may introduce the co-conspirator's declarations
without encountering any of the risks of calling him as a witness, thereby
denying the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a witness against
him.
In addressing the defendant's dilemma of having a co-conspirator's
extrajudicial statements used against him, Inadi suggests that the defend-
ant always has the option of calling the declarant under Federal Rule of
Evidence 806.322 Rule 806 allows the defendant to "examine [the declar-
ant] on the statement as if under cross-examination. ' 32 3 The Court relies
on the compulsory process clause324 to aid the defendant in obtaining the
325declarant's presence.
The Court, however, is mistaken in equating the sixth amendment
confrontation clause with the compulsory process clause.32 6 The two are
not the same. In fact, they are the opposite of each other. The difference
lies in allocating "between the prosecution and the defense the burden of
taking the initiative in identifying the witnesses to be produced. ' 327 The
confrontation clause places on the prosecution the burden of confronting
the defendant with witnesses against him, whereas the compulsory pro-
cess clause places on the defendant the burden of identifying and request-
ing the production of witnesses in his favor.328 In other words, "the
manner in which the two clauses allocate the burden of producing wit-
318. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127. Curiously, the Court does acknowledge in a footnote that
probably neither the prosecution nor the defense wanted to call the declarant because he may
have damaged both sides. Id. at 1127 n.7.
319. Id. at 1127 n.7.
320. Id. at 1126.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1127-28; see supra note 221.
323. FED. R. EvID. 806.
324. See supra note 225.
325. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1128.
326. See supra note 225.
327. See Westen, supra note 269, at 602.
328. Id.
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nesses is designed to assist the accused in presenting a defense." '329 The
Inadi Court's assertion that the defendant's confrontation rights are not
violated because the defendant can use the compulsory process clause to
call adverse witnesses defeats the very purpose of both sixth amendment
protections.
In addition, a significant practical-burden is placed on the defendant
by having him identify co-conspirator declarations. Since conspirators
often share information only on a "need to know" basis,33 the defendant
may be in no better position than the prosecution to make the identifica-
tions.33' As between the two sides, the prosecution is better able to iden-
tify and produce the declarant than the defendant.332
The Court's equation of the confrontation clause with the compul-
sory process clause also deprives the defendant of a significant tactical
advantage that the confrontation clause was meant to provide. One com-
mentator wrote that "the sixth amendment allocates the burden of pro-
duction between the prosecution and the defense in order to facilitate the
defendant's interest in being able to secure and examine witnesses at a
time when their incriminating evidence is not yet frozen in the jury's
mind.
333
Inadi's suggestion that the defendant may call and examine the de-
clarant "as if under cross-examination" using Federal Rule of Evidence
806334 does not address the problem of the substantial time lapse from
the time the prosecution introduces the extrajudicial statements to the
time the declarant is examined. Under the Court's proposal, the prosecu-
tion can introduce the damaging declarations of the co-conspirator ab-
sent any inquiry into the reliability of the statements.335 The only cross-
examination the defendant is able to conduct during this time is how and
whether the statements were made. Inquiry into the reliability of the
statement would have to wait for the prosecution to rest its case. Only
then would the defendant be able to call the declarant. By that time it
may be too late. The jurors may have already irrevocably drawn their
conclusions. 336 Justice Marshall noted in his dissent that " '[o]nly a law-
yer without trial experience would suggest that the limited right to im-
peach one's own witness is the equivalent of that right to immediate
329. Id. at 616.
330. See Note, supra note 250, at 1311.
331. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1133-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 1134. See Westen, supra note 269. at 616.
333. See Westen, supra note 269, at 616 (emphasis added).
334. Ihadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127-28. See supra note 221.
335. Ihadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1134.
336. Id.
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cross-examination which has always been regarded as the greatest safe-
guard of American trial procedure.' 331
The defendant in federal prosecutions loses an additional advantage.
In a federal criminal proceeding, no statement made by a prosecution
witness is discoverable until after the witness has testified on direct exam-
ination.338 Since the prosecution may use the out-of-court declarations
of a co-conspirator without having to produce the declarant, the prosecu-
tion will likely never place the declarant on direct examination. Thus,
the co-conspirator's statements are not even discoverable to the defense
prior to the trial which heightens the risk of trial by affidavit. Inadi not
only places the burden on the defendant to identify and initiate the pro-
duction of witnesses against him, but the defendant loses the statutory
right to obtain prior statements of the witnesses in the government's
possession.339
Therefore, the belief that the unavailability rule is unnecessary be-
cause it would not provide much testimony that would aid the "truth-
determining process" 340 is wholly unrealistic. The unavailability require-
ment helps protect defendants from trial by affidavit, the very abuse upon
which the confrontation clause was founded.34'
D. Burdens versus Benefits of the Unavailability Rule
The impetus behind the United States v. Inadi 342 decision appears to
be the Court's concern for prosecutorial efficiency. The Court weighed
the benefits against the burdens of the unavailability rule, and found that
the unavailability requirement "automatically adds another avenue of ap-
pellate review in these complex cases" and "impose[s] a substantial bur-
den on the entire criminal justice system. ' 343 However, the Court failed
to cite any case support for its conclusion. In fact, the very position the
Court took concerning the heavy burden that the unavailability rule
places on the penal system was previously rejected in Barber v. Page.3"
In addressing the lack of prosecutorial effort to produce the declarant,
the Barber Court held that "a witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of
337. Id. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147
F.2d 297, 305 (U.S. App. D.C. 1945)).
338. Id. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra note 278 and accompanying text.
339. Id.
340. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
341. See supra note 53.
342. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
343. Id. at 1128.
344. 390 U.S. 719, 723-25 (1968). See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
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the ... confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities
have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial .... The
right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly. 3 45 The
Court always had to weigh the defendant's right of confrontation against
the necessities of the case. 346 However, without the unavailability re-
quirement, the issue of necessity is never reached, for the prosecution
need not even attempt to produce the declarant whose out-of-court state-
ment it wishes to use against the defendant. Surely, with extrajudicial
declarations as devastating as those of co-conspirators, requiring that the
prosecution make a good faith effort to secure the presence of the declar-
ant is not too much to ask.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of the confrontation clause, the hallmark of
this constitutional protection has been the strong belief in a defendant's
right to cross-examine witnesses against him. In 1895, the Court wrote
in the leading confrontation case that "[t]he primary objective of the
[confrontation clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits
... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness. ' 347 The United States v. Inadi 348 deci-
sion signals a return to thevery abusive practices which the confronta-
tion clause was created to prevent. 349 The decision allows the
prosecution to introduce a co-conspirator's extrajudicial declarations
without making even the slightest effort to produce the declarant for
cross-examination.350 While prosecutors may applaud, this decision is
sadly reminiscent of the days of trial by affidavit.
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